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I) Introduction	  	  
In the modern economic environment franchising is a key tool. This type of operation 
has its origins in the early 1880s and according to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) 
since then grew in importance. It can be defined as an arrangement between the 
franchisor and the franchisee, whereas the franchisor as the founder of a unique 
business formally sells the right to use its trade name and operating system to the 
franchisee. Why firms prefer this type of franchising over other organizational forms 
has been tried to be explained by different theories over time. One of the main 
theories is the resource-based view. According to Barney, Wright et al. (2001) the 
resource-based view may be the “most influential framework for understanding 
strategic management.” Due to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) two dominant forms 
of ownership strategy of franchising,emerged over time: single-unit franchising and 
multi-unit franchising. With regard to the last, the franchisee is obliged the right to 
“own” more than just one outlet. Based on Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) as well 
as Kaufmann and Dant (1996) multi-unit franchising has major advantages over 
single-unit franchising, as accelerated company-growth, scale economies, greater 
market penetration or greater financial strength. In past years literature focused more 
and more on this topic, but it still lacks empirical background. In this study we will link 
multi-unit franchising with the resource-base view, focusing on financial resource 
scarcity, local market knowledge and system specific assets. Using a broad study of 
the Austrian Franchise Sector we tested our hypotheses about the ownership 
strategy of franchising empirically which is the objective of this thesis.  
The remainder is structured as follows: the first part gives an overview about the 
topic franchising in general, its origin, development and characterization. The two big 
groups, single– and multi-unit franchising are examined in detail. The next section 
focuses on the resource-based view and organizational capabilities. As this is the 
basis for further analysis we then focus on the interaction between multi-unit 
franchising and the resource-based view. In the empirical part the established 
hypotheses are statistically analysed and further discussed.  
	   6	  
A)	  The	  case	  of	  Franchising	  	  
 
Franchising is a key tool of today’s business. Meldelsohn (1985) states that the 
impact of franchising has grown tremendous since the birth of this entrepreneurial 
form in the late 1940s and 1950s in the US and its brisk spreading to other countries 
around the world . According to the International Franchise Association (2005) the 
total output of all franchised businesses in the United States in the year 2005 
amounted to $ 880,000 billion. This number results from approximately 910,000 
established franchised businesses, which corresponds to 3.3 % of the total U.S. 
private sector.  
 
A.1)	  Franchising:	  An	  introduction	  	  
According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000)  the first franchising distribution 
networks were initiated in Europe in the early 1880s when beer brewers made 
special arrangements regarding the exclusive sale of beer and ale with certain bars. 
Some years later, in 1863 the first consumer product franchise system was created 
by the Singer Sewing Machine Company in US. At this time, franchising as a type of 
distribution network, grew in importance and in the 1890s most soft drink or 
automobile industries adopted this type of network. Some 40 years later, also 
petroleum producers trusted in franchising. This early period of franchising is 
classified by Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) as the “first generation of 
franchising” and is called to date “product and trade name franchising”. According to 
Preble (1995) it is most common in the automobile, retail gasoline as well as soft- 
drink industry. The main characteristic of this system is that a franchisee sells and 
distributes a product under the trade name of the franchisor.  
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) further reveal that in the 1950s the “second 
generation” of franchising began to emerge. The idea shifted from the mere 
distribution of goods under a foreign trade name to a more market–oriented view: the 
franchisor enabled the franchisee to rent his entire business idea. The first step 
toward this new business format evolved in 1935 as Howard Johnson initiated the 
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first franchised restaurant chain. This type of franchising is characterized as 
“business-format franchising”. The franchisee duplicates the entire business format of 
the franchisor, including quality control, marketing-strategy, operating-manual and 
standards.  
According to Norton (1988) as well as Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) franchising in 
general refers to a relationship whereas the franchisee buys the right of using trade 
name, operating system or product specifications of the franchisor. The franchisor, as 
the entrepreneur, is the founder and builder of a unique business format with a 
developed product or service and carries out the duty of managing the franchising 
network of independent business owners. According to literature (Caves and Murphy 
1976; Justis and Judd 1998; Combs and Ketchen 2003)  the franchisee is admitted 
the right to sell the products or services of the franchisor in a specified region for a 
certain time. Grünhagen and Dorsch (2003)  wrote that the franchisee is obliged to 
pay an entry fee, recurring royalties as well as advertising fees in return for the 
possibility to use the business format of the franchisor which also includes services. 
Those may comprise legal advice, consultations regarding the location, trainings, or 
campaigns of national advertisements.  In other words, according to Castrogiovanni 
and Justis (1998) a franchise organization can be seen as a network of the franchisor 
which is the parent organization and the franchisee who is acting as the local 
manager. The term franchising in a more narrow sense thus determines the 
contractual arrangement according to which the network is built up and developed. 
Kotabe (2009) explicates that a franchise system typically appears in an environment 
with a relatively high ratio of competition or quickly changing customer needs. 
Particularly the fast food industry is dominated by franchising, due to its highly 
competitive environment. On the contrary franchising companies appear less in high-
risk industries or in markets with high wages, as these circumstances reflect a 
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A.2)	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  franchising	  network	  
 
According to Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) franchising can be separated from 
other organizational forms by three aspects:  
• Geographic dispersal of organization units 
• Replication across units 
• Joint ownership 
The authors state, regarding “geographical dispersal of organization units”, that 
franchising is seen as a way to amplify the existing distribution channels. The access 
to resources such as financial or managerial, franchised units permit a quicker 
expansion than under full company ownership. Considering Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
(1968 - 1969) and Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) franchisors often buy the 
franchised units if the internal resources have risen enough. This is amongst others 
the case if markets tend to be overexploited and a further expansion is not beneficial 
anymore. Cochet, Dormann et al. (2008) state that the geographic dispersion of units 
due to system-wide standardization, allows to realize economies of scale. Thus 
franchising is a way to pursue growth strategies and to benefit from the expertise and 
knowledge of the franchisees. 
Other scholars depict franchising as a form of vertical integration (Harrigan 1985; 
Carnery and Gedajlovic 1991; Grünhagen and Dorsch 2003). Carnery and Gedajlovic  
(1991) reveal that in this case the benefits of franchising units reside in the saving of 
investments in the required assets.  Furthermore financial resources needed for full 
integration can therefore be used elsewhere. Nevertheless a company that chooses 
franchising as its entrepreneurial form rarely franchises all of its units but owns some 
itself.  
In the article “The nature of the firm” Coase (1937) the question why franchising 
would be more beneficial than company ownership is discussed by two contrary 
types of economic organizations: markets and firms. In markets, beneficial exchange 
transactions can be realized. However, if positive transaction costs arise, firms are 
able to carry out transactions more efficiently and at the same time are able to save 
costs. Consequently Norton (1988) reckons that  hybrid forms of organizations are 
also possible as that they allow firms to incorporate advantages of both types, . With 
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regard to franchising the quality resulting of market-like entities lies in the bargaining 
between two unities that are operating in product, labour or capital markets. The 
other aspect, the firm-like benefit is the bilateral network between the two unities. As 
previsously mentioned, the franchisor provides the franchisee trainings, 
advertisements or managerial assistance during exhibiting considerably control with 
extensive performance criteria.  
 
A.3)	  Benefits	  of	  franchising	  	  
One of the principal reasons for firms to adopt a franchise perspective, is outlined in 
the “growth thesis” (Kaufmann and Dant 1998; Gómez, González et al. 2010). 
Gómes, Gonzáles et al. (2010) state that firms want to expand their networks and by 
making use of franchising,  achieve economies of scale., In the field of purchasing as 
well as marketing a higher brand-knowledge can be created. . Therefore the use of 
franchising allows the franchisor to enhance the profitability of his investment.  
According to Kaufmann and Dant (1998) entrepreneurs lack certain resources, that 
are indispensable to pursue a growth strategy. Furthermore opening up new units 
contains unique risks. Thus if firms come to the point, where they cannot monitor or 
control their company-outlets anymore, entrepreneurs often choose franchising as a 
strategy that allows to align the incentives and interests of franchisees and those of 
the franchisor. In this sense, franchising could also be labelled as entrepreneurial 
partnership.  
Shane (1996) conducted a study whether franchised firms would have a higher 
probability to survive than other forms of organizations. He stated, that through the 
rapid growth of franchised systems, economies of scales could be accomplished 
quickly. In order to persist in a competitive environment, firms have to establish a 
competitive cost structure. Through rapid expansion, firms can reach a necessary 
competitive level before cash flow problems can emerge.  
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A.4)	  Single-­‐unit	  franchising	  vs.	  multi-­‐unit	  franchising:	  An	  introduction	  	  
A franchisor seeking to expand his business, can either open up company-owned 
units or follow a franchise strategy (Windsperger and Hussain 2010).  With regard to 
the second point, two strategies are to suceed:  A single-unit strategy or a multi-unit 
strategy. Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005), and Windsperger and Hussain (2010) 
state, that due to growth strategies single-unit franchising has been the dominant 
research area regarding franchising systems in recent decades.  In the case of 
single-unit franchising a franchisee is limited to just one business unit (Garg, 
Rasheed et al. 2005).  
Weaven and Frazer (2006) conducted an analysis on the incentives of single-unit 
franchisees to enter a franchise-contract. They identified some important factors 
concerning the franchise opportunity. The first factor is that single-unit franchisees 
commonly do not attempt to further expand their business units as it is the case with 
multi-unit franchising. Second, single-unit franchisees concern brand name, 
reputation and the market position of the franchised company when choosing the 
right franchising company. Third, the initial training and support is of great importance 
for single-unit franchisees and they expect to determine their own working hours as 
in contrast to a salaried employment. Weaven and Frazer (2006) further conducted 
research about the employment history of single-unit franchisees. In case of a self-
employment history franchisees believe more in an opportunistic behaviour of the 
franchisor regarding re-investing of advertising fees into product or service 
modernization.   
 
A.5)	  Multi-­‐	  Unit	  Franchising	  	  	  
Weaven and Frazer (2007) state that in past years literature focused more and more 
on multi-unit franchising, as this is a relatively new field in research. Based on 
Chalupnik (2009)  multi-unit franchising has major advantages over single unit 
franchising as e.g. accelerated growth, greater financial strength, a better market 
penetration strategy or a reduction in training or assistance needs.  
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A.5.1)	  Types	  of	  multi-­‐unit	  franchising	  	  
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) depict that multi-unit franchising has grown in 
importance over the past years, as it is now the prevalent type of franchising in the 
US. This franchise system enables the franchisee to operate more than one unit at a 
time and at multiple geographic locations. In this sense there exist three different 
systems of multi-unit franchising: 
• Subfranchising 
• Area development multi-unit strategy 
• Sequential multi-unit strategy 
 
A.5.1.1)	  Subfranchising	  	  
Corresponding to Kaufmann and Dant (1995) the first form of franchising, namely 
“sub franchising” is also called “master franchising”. It has two important differences 
to the single-unit franchise system: First, it gives the franchisee the right of using an 
exclusive territory, which goes far beyond the area of a single-unit and second it 
establishes another form of controlling body between the franchisor and the manager 
of the franchised unit. A master franchisee, (also called the subfranchisor) is enabled 
from the franchisor to give franchises to others (so called subfranchisees) in a 
predetermined area. Thus the subfranchisor is responsible for his franchisees and 
undertakes the tasks of the franchisor for his geographical division. As compensation 
for this function, the subfranchisor is paid royalty payments.  This form of franchising 
mostly takes place internationally, as the underlying additional control body would 
just complicate the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisees 
domestically.  
 
A.5.1.2)	  Area	  development	  multi-­‐unit	  strategy	  	  
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) suggest that the other two franchise systems, 
namely area-development multi-unit strategy and sequential multi-unit strategy are 
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the preferred form domestically as both types allow the franchisee himself to open up 
additional business units.  
In the case of area development multi-unit strategy the franchisor requires the 
franchisee contractually to establish a certain number of units in a predetermined 
time frame. As the franchisee is obliged to open up additional units the growth 
process of this so established “mini-chain” is a quick one. Normally area developers 
trade in a specific geographic area, which is specified by the franchisor.   
 
A.5.1.3)	  Sequential	  multi-­‐unit	  strategy	  
 
In contrast to area-development multi-unit strategy, the sequential multi-unit strategy 
allows the franchisee to open up additional business units without the contractual 
obligation (Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2000). Each unit is therefore initiated by a 
separate franchise contract. The franchisee obtains the right to subsequently grow 
his business with respect to his financial opportunities and economic situation. 
Franchisees in this franchising system generally operate fewer units than area 
developers, as their growth process is a slower one. Regarding the allocation of 
franchised units there exist two types that have to be distinguished: 
• Non-projected sequential multi-unit franchising 
• Projected multi-unit franchising 
Windsperger and Hussain (2010) state, that regarding the first system “non-projected 
sequential multi-unit franchising” the franchisee is allowed to open up additional 
outlets until his performance reaches a certain level. Therefore the growth process is 
based upon performance criteria. In the other form “projected multi-unit franchising” 
the franchisor calculates and plans the assignment of new units to existing 
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A.5.2)	  Literature	  examination	  	  
The following chapter focuses on the literature examination regarding multi-unit 
franchising. We will focus on the perspective of the franchisor as well as the 
franchisee and highlight the benefits of multi-unit franchising.  	  
A.5.2.1)	  Multi-­‐unit	  franchising	  -­‐	  a	  franchisor’s	  perspective	  
 
Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) suggest that growth is one of the main arguments why 
firms choose franchising. This view is in accordance with Chalupnik (2009), who  
depicts, that by using multi-unit franchising companies are able to expand more 
quickly. In this sense, according to  Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) through the 
development of economies of scale, e.g. advertisement costs, administrative 
expenditures, etc. costs can be distributed to a larger amount of business units.  
Company-owned units do not have the financial or managerial resources as well as 
local market know-how to spur expansion of their business. This is even amplified in 
the case of small franchises that operate in uncertain environments or fierce 
competition, as they would otherwise not survive. On the other hand large-scale 
franchises that are arranged in very price- sensitive environment need greater 
economies of scale to be competitive. Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) proved that the 
expectation of the franchisor to add additional units is positively related to the use of 
multi-unit franchising. Additionally the scholars tested whether the use of area 
development multi-unit franchising was also affected by the expectation of unit 
additions.  
Weaven and Frazer (2007) stated, that  mature and sophisticated franchise systems 
are more likely to adopt a multi-unit strategy. In the case of a very competitive 
environment multi unit franchising facilitates strong reputation and unit growth which 
is of special importance. In the initial growth phase most franchisors do not possess 
the required market presence or a strong brand name, which turns them into high-
risk ventures. Therefore it is difficult to attract adequate franchisees. A disadvantage 
in the early life cycle of franchises is that franchisors lack important know-how or 
administrative capabilities necessary for the development of a multi-unit strategy. 
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This is the same for continuous training, supervision or mentoring as well as 
monitoring abilities. 
Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) proposed a theory that mature franchise systems which 
possess more reputation and organizational routines inhibit less risk to potential 
franchisees and can in fact attract higher quality multi-unit franchisees. Accordingly 
franchisors can show their solidarity in later phases of the life cycle  by preserving 
long-term relationships with franchisees. Weaven and Herington (2007) further 
mention that multi-unit franchising encourages the growth of the system as it 
minimizes the costs of searching possible new candidates for further business units.  
Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between the size of the 
franchise network and the use of multi-unit franchising. They hypothesized that as 
the network grows, the brand name value is going to increase equally and therefore 
sales and market shares as well. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems can 
be amplified. If the network grows, a single franchisee will find it easier to free-ride as 
he does not have to cope with the negative consequences on his own. Instead the 
growing number of franchisees will absorb the effects.  
Weaven and Frazer (2007) proved significant correlation between a franchise system 
that adopts plural forms of distribution and multi-unit franchising. Multi-unit 
franchisors stated, that prior to adapting a multi-unit strategy company-owned stores 
were established for further training and mentoring. Through the plural form of 
distribution, franchisors could develop and enhance service as well as product quality 
and delivery, support procedures, or logistical functions. Thus internal learning took 
place and the new built capabilities were transferred from company-owned stores to 
multi-unit franchisees that in turn made the expansion strategy easier.  
The authors also found a relationship between the franchise system complexity and 
multi-unit franchising. At one hand, through the installation of mini-chains, the 
franchisee works as an additional control layer within the units. Notwithstanding 
monitoring costs or administrative efforts by the franchisor cannot be alleviated.  
With regard to the organizational form, Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) found a positive 
relationship between area development franchising and system uniformity. They 
stated, that area developers could more easily retain system uniformity, as they first 
of all already possess multi-unit skills that are needed. As the beginning of the 
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franchise relationship, franchisees already possess the information and will to open 
up additional units and thus start from the outset to learn and acquire the intellectual 
and physical resources that are needed to retain uniformity. On the other hand also 
franchisors would spend more training hours and support with multi-unit franchisees.  
Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) present the argument, that multi-unit systems 
disaggregate ownership and control of local business units because franchisees  
have to position local unit managers. Hence, a hierarchical structure is created 
whereas the positive features of franchising, as described above, would be destroyed 
by the use of multi-unit franchising.  
 
A.5.2.2)	  Multi-­‐unit	  franchising	  -­‐	  a	  franchisee’s	  perspective	  	  
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) concentrated on the reasons why franchisees 
would prefer multi-unit franchising to single-unit franchising. They hypothesize that a 
franchisee that favours multi-unit franchising has more possibilities or money to 
invest in this business. Weaven and Frazer (2006) support this theory with their 
findings and state, that multi-unit franchisees would engage in franchise systems that 
advocate the expansion of mini-chains.  
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) question why  a franchisee would engage in 
franchising instead of investing the money somewhere else as e.g. in the equity 
market. Therefore the authors mention that another possible explanation for the 
investment in a franchise chain is that franchisees are better able to gain advantages 
through “larger, geographically dispersed operations” (Grünhagen and Mittelstadt 
(2000)) as their business grows. Another presumption is a philosophical one. 
Franchisees, particularly those that open up units sequentially exhibit or establish 
entrepreneurial spirit.  
The findings of Weaven and Frazer (2006) concerning the franchise opportunity for 
multi-unit franchisees accentuate the importance of ongoing training as well as 
support for the franchisee. As contrary to single-unit franchisees they tend to trust the 
incentives of the franchisor regarding marketing or advertising costs.  
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B)	  The	  Resource-­‐based	  View	  and	  Organizational	  Capabilities	  
 
 
According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) the franchising strategy has been 
tried to explain since the 1960s with the start of the franchise company McDonald’s. 
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2002) state, that research about franchising, has 
developed different perspectives about why firms prefer this organizational form to 
others. Aliochue and Schlentrich (2008) state that the two main theories in this field 
are the resource scarcity view that is built upon the resource-based theory and the 
contradictory agency theory. According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) the first 
assertion about this topic was the resource-based view. The resource-based view 
may be “the most influential framework for understanding strategic management ” 
((Barney, Wright et al. 2001).  Due to Dant and Kaufmann (2003), one of the first 
authors that tried to explain the use of franchising in terms of the resource-based 
view was Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968 - 1969). They assumed that the lack of 
resources, mainly in the early life-cycle stage could be overcome by the use of 
franchising.  
The aim of the following section is to delineate the resource-based view and 
organizational capabilities. At first a broad description of the topic is provided. 
Following the theory of the resource-based view the resource scarcity theory, local 
market assets and system specific assets will be defined.  
 
B.1)	  The	  resource-­‐based	  view	  and	  organizational	  capabilities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The resource-based view is concerned with the topic why some firms outperform 
others (Ordóñez de Pablos, Peteraf et al. 2007). Accordingly the resource-based 
view attempts to measure how economic value is created and sustained (Kim and 
Mahoney 2007). Penrose (1959) stated, that economic rents are achieved through 
the utilization of resources of a firm.  The productive services, which are obtained 
from these resources, are a driving force in firm heterogeneity.  
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According to the literature on resource-based theory the existence of intangible 
assets are a major part in describing firm heterogeneity (Mahoney and Pandian 
1992). Normally high performance-firms possess many types of intangible assets like 
know-how, marketing assets, patents, or designs. These kinds of assets are quite 
likely to be subjects to market failure. All in all idiosyncratic physical, human and 
intangible resources are the main drivers for firm heterogeneity. Kim and Mahoney 
(2007) reveal, that in order to develop economic rents, resources have to be 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. Combs, Ketchen et al. (2010) further 
depict, that those resources that inhibit all these criteria are called strategic 
resources.     
Mahoney and Pandian (1992) assert that a portfolio of different resources, skills and 
especially the coherence across resources is the key of sustained business 
performance. Thus, the source of a firm´s uniqueness are its organizational 
capabilities (Ulrich and Lake 1990).  A more complex definition of organizational 
capability is provided from the authors, namely “a business’s ability to establish 
internal structures and processes that influence its members to create organization-
specific competencies and thus enable the business to adapt to changing customer 
and strategic needs” (Ulrich and Lake 1990). In this means, the successful 
implementation of organizational capabilities depends on teamwork; it is the creation 
of organizational policies and procedures that can be influenced through engagement 
of employees. In order to gain competitive advantage, the firm has to supplement its 
activities with organizational capabilities. The internal company-own systems and 
processes should be directed towards the realization of benefits and goals of a firm 
as an entity to efficiently satisfy customer needs . 
Tan and Mahoney (2005) argue, that modern businesses emerge because of the 
existence of economies of scale, which is enabled through innovations. Innovations 
and technologies are an outcome of organizational capabilities that are dynamically 
developed over time. For the process of adapting resources and capabilities to be 
economically competitive, firms will bear dynamic adjustment costs. If the adaption 
process of resources disturbs or even averts current working processes, adjustment 
costs arise. According to Tan and Mahoney(2005) , these expenses are one of the 
main reasons, why limits to the expansion of a firm exist.  
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During the growth phase of a firm its managerial capacities are insufficient to 
overcome the rapid changing process of the system. This managerial constraint on 
the system growth rate is also called the “Penrose effect”. In 1959 Penrose stated, 
that a firm is consisting of a bundle of different resources. Consequently its managers 
are of duty to effectively control and guide the resources and also produce new 
capabilities. Therefore only managers that have internal know-how about the 
complex structure of the firm and a good relationship to the other employees can 
carry out this duty. As it takes time to educate managers from outside firms are 
limited to their inherent managerial capacity in process of expansion. If the company 
grows at a level that transcends this managerial constraint, problems are likely to 
emerge and the system growth is going to stagnate. Thompson (1994) suggested, 
that the Penrose effect could be overcome by a franchising strategy. In order to grow 
initially franchising is a good way to circumvent the managerial constraints. Due to 
organizational learning managers will acquire sufficient knowledge and will substitute 
franchised outlets to company-owned during the franchise life cycle.  
Shane (1996) also examined the Penrose effect of firms particularly in hybrid 
organizations. The author states that franchising is a good way to overcome 
managerial constraint as it reduces monitoring costs that would occur in the 
existence of company-owned units. During the growth process of a firm, managers 
have to appoint new employees. First of all the entrepreneurs would need a lot of 
time to elect possible and qualified employees as they differ in experiences, 
knowledge and capabilities. Employees are likely to shirk about their education and 
thus it takes more time for the manager to find the right information about the 
background of appropriate employees. Hence the placement of candidates involves 
costs and problems of adverse selection. Despite the problem of finding the right 
candidate, managers also have to monitor existing or new employees. As managers, 
which are not entrepreneurs in case of company-owned businesses, also tend to 
shirk regarding the agency view; entrepreneurs have to monitor them as well. In this 
case also the concern of moral hazard emerges. Franchising as a hybrid forms of 
organization allows to mitigate these problems. First of all franchisees act as residual 
claimants and the problem of monitoring new employees is therefore moderated. 
Second, franchisees that buy franchised business units show their qualification as 
they agree to be remunerated on uncertain profits of the units. Therefore the costs of 
the firm are reduced, as the entrepreneur does not have to scan potential salaried 
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outlet managers. Still franchisors have to monitor their franchisees as they may shirk 
on quality in expense to the business brand, but according to Shane this “misdirected 
effort” is less costly to monitor. As an outcome firms engaging in franchising can 
grow faster and at a lower cost than other forms of organizations.  
 
B.1.1)	  Competitive	  advantage	  
 
According to Foss (2003) the resource-based view is concerned with resources and 
internal capabilities that are inherent in a heterogeneous firm. Those resources or 
capabilities that are superior to those of the competitors can involve the potential of 
being basis for competitive advantage. Due to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) the resource-
based view tries to explain the evolution of competitive advantage with basis of 
resources that create value to the firm.  
Based on Teece (1997) one of the driving forces of firms conducting a business is to 
gain competitive advantage. Michael Porter presented one of the first main theories 
in the field of competitive advantage in 1980. It is seen as an approach of how firms 
can defend themselves against competitive forces. In this respect the company is 
seen as a part of the environment it competes in. In the five forces model, these five 
forces, namely “entry barriers, threat of substitution, bargaining power of buyers, 
bargaining power of suppliers and rivalry among industry incumbents” (Teece 1997) 
are the basis of an industry and thus the potential of gaining competitive advantage. 
The paradigm of the competitive forces therefore states that the rents, which are 
gained through the circumvention of the competitive forces, are monopoly rents. The 
strategy through which these rents are generated is mainly based on changing the 
position of the company compared to the position of its competitors or suppliers. In 
this respect main attention is drawn upon industry characteristics, as some industries 
are more favourable than others in terms of impediments to competitive forces.  
The author futher state, that the resource-based view bases competitive advantage 
on the existence of different assets, resources and capabilities that are inherent in 
the company as well as isolating mechanisms that as well present the basis of firm 
performance. Thus, firms are not profitable because of the industry they compete in, 
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instead rents are generated through scarce firm specific resources, which are 
inherent in the company.  
Peteraf (1993) developed a “parsimonious model” for describing a strategy of how to 
establish individual competitive advantage. It is consisting of four major assumptions, 
namely heterogeneity of the firm, ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource 
mobility and ex ante limits to competition. 
According to the author the first important factor in establishing superior firm 
performance, through competitive advantage, is heterogeneity of the firm. As stated, 
Penrose (1959) highlighted the importance of different resources and capabilities, 
which are heterogeneous across firms. This implies, that some resources or, 
according to Peteraf (1993) productive factors, are varying in their efficiency. 
Therefore, firms holding superior factors are able to gain higher rents. 
 The next indispensable factors for companies in this regard are ex post limits to 
competition. Firms are just able to gain rents if the condition of heterogeneity is 
sustainable over a long-term. Therefore in the absence of ex post limits to 
competition, heterogeneity is quite likely to be short-lived and thus susceptible to 
competition. In order to erode or limit ex post competition two factors can be taken 
into regard: imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability. Firms can shelter 
themselves through the use of isolating mechanisms. These mechanisms maintain 
the rent streams of companies through protection of imitation. Examples for isolating 
mechanisms are property rights to scarce resources or information asymmetries. 
Lippmann and Rumelt (1982) highlight the existence of causal ambiguity, in the 
sense that uncertainty can emerge in regard to the causes of efficiency discrepancies 
among companies. Thus, causal ambiguity impedes that potential competitors know 
exactly what or how to imitate. Of course, intangible assets like reputation, buyer 
search costs or producer learning also make huge contributions to isolating 
mechanisms. 
The third factor in the model of Peteraf (1993) is imperfect mobility. It is described as 
resources that can be traded and are “specialized to firm-specific needs” which 
incorporates the fact that these are more valuable to the firm as to its competitors. 
Therefore, as competitors view these resources as less valuable, they are a source 
of competitive advantage because they remain in the firm over the long-term .  
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The last assumption, ex ante limits to competition denotes that before the firm is 
building a superior resource position it has to make sure that only a limited amount of 
competitors is already in the same position. Barney  (1986) extends this statement by 
adding that the performance of a company does not only depend on economic rents, 
but also on the costs of implementing a strategy. Scholars as Barney (1986) or 
Peteraf (1993) state, that imperfections of strategic factor markets, where resources 
can be obtained, are of great importance, as firms are just able to gain superior 
revenues in such a situation. According to Peteraf (1993) each of the four 
assumptions has to be investigated on their own as they all play a particular and 
distinct role in creating competitive advantage. 
 
B.1.2)	  Resource	  management	  process	  	  
Based on Combs, Ketchen et al. (2010) the resource-based view argues, that firms 
can beat rivals because of their strategic resources. This of course has an impact on 
the performance of the firm. They way through which this performance is created 
concerns the resource management process, that is composed of three strategic 
actions: at first the structuring of resources, second bundling of resources and third, 
leveraging resources. Still, the exclusive possession of resources does not 
necessarily result in competitive advantage or further in the creation of value. The 
environment of a company can help to enhance the value of its resources, but 
entrepreneurs have to know which strategic actions further amplify their potential. 
According to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) a strategic resource management process is 
indispensable for the creation of value. In his Model, Sirmon describes the value 
creation for the customer through structuring, bundling and leveraging resources, 
which also has important implication for franchising and in this study primarily for 
multi-unit franchising.  
Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) depict that through the synchronization of all three 
processes the value creation path can be optimized in a way that the difference 
between the costs for the firm and the revenues or prices it  receives by costumers 
can be meliorated.  
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Further the authors state that two important variables of the whole resource 
management process are organizational learning and environmental uncertainty 
(Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007). Regarding organizational learning, new knowledge can be 
acquired and thus applied to decision-making, which is of major importance 
concerning dynamic environments. Environmental uncertainty, which is defined by 
Carpenter and Frederikson (2001) as ”a consequence of environmental factors that 
generally result in a lack of the information needed to assess means-ends 
relationships, make decisions, and confidently assign probabilities to their outcomes”. 
Due to uncertainty that firms are confronted with they accordingly change the 
management of their resources (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007). This may inhibit the 
uncertainty of competitors’ actions, changes in the market environment or demand 
and environmental shocks. Figure 1 shows the resource management process in 
detail.  
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Figure 1: A Dynamic Resource Management Model of Value Creation (Sirmon, Hitt et 
al. 2007). 
 
B.1.2.1)	  Structuring	  the	  resource	  portfolio	  	  
Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) state that the first part, namely “Structuring the resource 
portfolio” deals with the accumulation of resources and is split up into three sub-
processes: acquiring, accumulating and divesting. The first process, acquiring means 
the extern acquisition of resources that a firm does not possess. Michael (2003) 
states that businesses lack financial resources as well as local market knowledge 
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and people with managerial skills to expand his business. Franchising is thus a way 
to overcome the resource scarcity problem. 
According to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) the accumulation of resources deals with the 
internal advancement of resources. This is necessary to build up isolating 
mechanisms and prepares the firm for uncertain environmental changes or strategic 
strokes by the competitor. Generally the accumulation of resources is developed 
through organizational learning. Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) depict that 
franchising in this sense offers the opportunity to learn from and with the partner 
franchisee. Furthermore franchise systems allow a much better opportunity for 
organizational learning than company-owned businesses. 
The third process, namely divesting refers to disposing of resources that can do not 
contribute to the competitive advantage of the company. Thus firms need to monitor 
continuously its inherent resources and capabilities (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007).   
 
B.1.2.2)	  Bundling	  resources	  	  
The second part of the resource management process is about bundling resources to 
build capabilities. Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) depict that each capability consists of a 
special combination of resources which develops value and performance. Three 
processes can be differentiated: stabilizing, enriching and pioneering. Stabilizing 
refers to amelioration of already existing capabilities. As an example for this process, 
managers could be trained some hours per year to refresh their know-how. In the 
same sense, franchisors should not just practice and instruct the franchisee at the 
beginning of their relationship . Ongoing training may be difficult if the franchising 
chain consists of several single-unit franchisees, as the costs for support would be 
unbearable high. If the franchisor would just have to train the executives of mini-
chains, as it is the case in multi-unit franchising, costs would be much lower. The 
multi-unit franchisee on the other hand would therefore be responsible himself to 
circulate the information to his outlets. If both partners believe in the wealth-creating 
opportunity through the right management of resources, monitoring costs will be low 
and the franchisee will ensure that all his business units receive the right amount of 
information.  
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According to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) in the process of enriching, existing 
capabilities should be extended. Through organizational learning know-how can be 
developed and added to already consisting capabilities. Pioneering further extends 
this process, as in this case new resources should be acquired through learning.  
 
B.1.2.3)	  Leveraging	  capabilities	  
 
Leveraging capabilities refers to the extent to which a company can create customer 
value. In this regard Combs, Ketchen et al. (2010)  indentified two resources that are 
of prior importance in leveraging capabilities namely firm-specific top management 
team experience and specific knowledge that is grounded in the operation. The 
management team of a company has generated important knowledge and long-built 
relationships that are important for the wealth of a business. Regarding franchising, 
franchisors established relationships with their franchisees that may be related to 
trust in order to implement organizational changes or other activities. In this way it is 
important for the franchisor to have enough information about standardization and 
quality to enhance this resources in the case of expansion of the company. 
Managers that have close relationships to the franchisees may be able to gain 
idiosyncratic resources or knowledge. This may be the fact in e.g. local market 
adaptations or service quality, which is of major importance to customers. Thus, from 
learning of the different partners of the network, managers or franchisors could 
further enlarge their firm specific top management team experience. Accordingly with 
the growth of a franchising company  the intern firm specific knowledge as well can 
be amplified (Combs, Ketchen et al. 2010) .   
Summing up, as all parts of the resource management process are important on their 
own, to create and enhance value of the company, the processes have to be 
adjusted. The franchisor has to see his franchise chain as a whole organization, 
consisting of different resources that have to be managed in the right way (Sirmon, 
Hitt et al. 2007). 
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B.1.3)	  Contradictions	  to	  the	  resource-­‐based	  view	  	  
There are some theories that contradict the resource-based view. The most explored 
thesis in this regard is the agency argument for franchising which is described in the 
following section (Garg and Rasheed 2003). 
 
B.1.3.1)	  Agency	  argument	  for	  franchising	  	  
According to Garg and Rasheed (2003) the agency argument for franchising is well 
examined in respect to the single-unit franchising strategy. Generally the agency 
theory examines the delegation of assignments from the principal to the agent. The 
principal is one party that assigns a job to another party, namely the agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Due to Garg and Rasheed (2003) the interest of the principal and 
the agent can disperse whereas the agent may try to cheat in regard to information 
he is passing on to the principal. If this information concerns the education and skills 
of the agent this is called the adverse selection problem and concerning effort it is 
called the moral hazard problem. Two theories aim at alleviating these problems: 
residual claimancy and monitoring (Garg and Rasheed 2003).  
Regarding the first theory, residual claimancy, Garg and Rasheed (2003) state that 
the interests of a company-hired business-unit manager are more likely to diverge 
from the interests of the entrepreneur (here the franchisor) than those from the 
franchisee. The underlying reason is that franchisees will attempt to maximize their 
own present value and will not shirk on their efforts accordingly. Company-hired 
managers commonly receive fixed pay-offs and therefore won’t bear the costs of 
shirking. This  implies the assumption that a franchising strategy will involve less 
monitoring costs than by running company-owned outlets. Due to Garg, Rasheed et 
al. (2005) franchise systems can grow faster and install more units then other 
company structures when costs are alleviated. Garg and Rasheed (2003) state that 
although monitoring costs can be saved through franchising another problem still 
remains: free riding. If the franchised business possesses high brand name capital, 
the franchisee might act in an opportunistic way. The franchisee could abuse the 
brand name in a way, that he diminishes the quality of service or products for 
example and can thus free-ride without anxiety of loosing his business, mainly in a 
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low repeat purchase location. The issue of free riding is amplified by higher brand 
name capital, as customers underlie the estimation that each business unit offers the 
same amount of quality and cannot easily detect quality differences.  
	  
B.2)	  Theories	  of	  multi-­‐unit	  franchising	  
 
In this section the three main theories of this paper are examined in detail: the 
resource scarcity view, local market assets and system specific assets. Before going 
into detail in the resource scarcity theory we will outline the life cycle theory, 
developed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly in 1968.   
Further we will link the ownership strategy of multi-unit franchising with the resource-
based view. Following this theoretical foundation we will derive the hypothesis for the 
empirical work.  
 
B.2.1.)	  Life	  cycle	  theory	  	  
The life cycle theory was fist developed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968 - 1969) and 
states that in order to overcome the lack of scarce resources companies would prefer 
franchising in the initial phase. Based on Combs and Ketchen (2003), small 
companies would try to spur expansion in order to achieve economies of scale, which 
would not be possible with company owned outlets. Thus if a critical rate would be 
reached and economies were realized the company would not longer need to expand 
and therefore try to spur returns at each business unit. The firm would therefore buy 
back the most lucrative franchised outlets and in the end the chain would mainly be 
company-owned. Mature franchising companies reduce their share of franchised 
outlets and studies show that the proportion of company-owned outlets will not 
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B.2.1.1)	  Resource	  scarcity	  	  
The resource scarcity view states that one of the main arguments for franchising is 
the absence of resources that would be needed for expansion or growth of business 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1996). According to Michael (2003) the franchisor is in the need 
of investment capital, as well as local market knowledge, which include desirable 
locations for the units and also sources of labour supply. The third important resource 
for the franchisor is managerial knowledge, meaning business unit managers that 
have enough information and know-how to efficiently handle the business concept at 
certain locations.  
Combs and Ketchen (2003) depict that for the purpose of investigating the resource 
scarcity view, three variables are used generally: age, system size and growth rate. 
In literature contrary studies exist, some in purpose of the resource scarcity view and 
others contrardicting it (Castrogiovanni, Combs et al. 2006; Aliochue and Schlentrich 
2008; Gómez, González et al. 2010). In a study by Combs and Ketchen (2003) the 
following assumptions were tested regarding the resource scarcity view: first if firm 
age and system size were negatively correlated with the use of franchising and if the 
firm growth rate and capital scarcity were positively related to the use of franchising. 
Combs and Ketchen could not support the resource scarcity view, whereas other 
authors found the contrary. Dant and Kaufmann (2003) examined franchised 
companies in the fast food industry. The authors found indeed support for the 
hypothesis, that the mature and the more resources franchised companies inhibit, the 
more the tendency toward company-owned businesses. The authors further  state 
that the view of limited resources would perfectly capture the real market 
environment in North America. Dant and Kaufmann depicted anther argument, 
namely that the role of multi-unit franchising was not embraced in their study. In case 
of mini-chains it would be much easier for the franchisor to buy back units. The 
authors highly recommend to take a closer look at the resource based view coupled 
with multi-unit franchising as some factors may be explained easier and be more 
viable.  
 
B.2.1.2)	  Assumptions	  to	  verify	  the	  resource	  scarcity	  view	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Michael (2003) states that two important assumptions are necessary in order for the 
resource scarcity model to be ture. The first one is related to the “first mover 
advantage”(Michael, 2003) of franchisors that try to grow and expand quickly in the 
product market of their franchise chain. Barney (1991) states, that firms that are the 
first in conducting a certain strategy can develop sustained competitive advantage 
over other companies. This could be the access to certain markets or distribution 
channels, or even goodwill.   
This view is also in accordance with the theory of Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) as they 
depicted that a reason to initiate franchising would be the penetration of markets as 
“widely and rapidly as possible, thus pre-empting valuable territory from competitors” 
(Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1968 - 1969). Michael (2003) also supported this theory through 
a study with franchising units in the restaurant industry. The author proposed three 
hypothesis: “chains that franchise earlier will achieve higher outlet share”, secondly, 
“higher outlet share will be associated with higher market share” and “higher market 
share will be associated with higher profitability of the chain”.  All assumptions could 
be verified and thus franchising as a means for resource acquisition as well as 
superior growth and profitability could be verified.   
Based on Michael (2003) the second assumption for the resource scarcity theory to 
be true concerns the market for resources. Barney (1991) explicates that according 
to the resource based view, resources that inhibit the potential of sustained 
competitive advantage have to fulfil four attributes: they have to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and the not-existence of strategically equivalent substitutes.  
According to Michael (2003)  the resource scarcity view therefore contradicts with the 
capital market theory that states that financial resources are not rare. In this sense a 
risk-averse franchisee would rather possess multiple units instead of just one single 
unit to diversify his risk. So if the franchisor would grant the franchisee only one 
single unit, he also has to offer higher returns. The following assumption is that the 
franchisor cannot be capital constrained if he chooses the single-unit alternative and 
therefore the more costly one.  
 
B.2.1.3)	  Two	  perspectives	  on	  the	  resource	  scarcity	  view	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Due to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) the resource scarcity view is composed of 
two fields: financial resource scarcity and local market assets. 	  
B.2.1.3.1)	  Financial	  resource	  scarcity	  	  
Based on Kaufmann and Dant (1998) the financial resource scarcity view is also 
referred to as the capital acquisition model in literature. This view explains the 
existence of franchising as an opportunity to overcome the lack of financial resources 
an entrepreneur faces when attempting to grow his business. According to Combs 
and Ketchen (1999) the capital that is derived from franchisees may be less costly 
than capital from equity market or debt.  According to Windsperger and Hussain 
(2010)  multi-unit franchisees should have better opportunities to invest in local units, 
than single-unit franchisees. Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) suggest, that 
through the incremental growth of multi-unit franchising the franchisor gains rapid 
increases in earnings. This assumption is also supported by Chalupnik (2009). The 
author states that multi-unit franchisees possess much stronger financial stability as 
well as resources. Additionally multi-unit franchisees inhibit the possibility to establish 
a partnership with less-developed franchisees that do not exhibit the financial capital 
to expand their units. Chalupnik (2009) further states, that multi-unit franchisees have 
a stronger balance sheet and a greater overall cash- flow. Due to Windsperger and 
Hussain (2010), the financial resource scarcity of the franchisor is positively related 
to the use of multi-unit franchising, as this form of franchising establishes superior 
growth opportunities through the stronger financial strength of the multi-unit 
franchisee. Hence, the following hypothesis is derived: 
 
 
H1: “Franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his tendency 
toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010). 
 
B.2.1.3.2)	  Local	  market	  assets	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Based on Bradach (1998) businesses often rival a great amount of competitors in 
different markets and environments. To face different customers needs in varying 
geographic positions is therefore a main task for growing businesses. Companies 
often challenge this requirement centrally by specialists who are in charge of local 
responses. Franchising on the other hand offers the opportunity to install a business 
unit manager, namely an individual franchisee that operates the local unit. Hence the 
franchisee is directly rewarded for his competence to sell products or services to 
customers. Thus contrary to a company, in a franchise arrangement the franchisee is 
per se the specialist for local market assets. The author investigated, that franchised 
systems could better, faster and more efficient react to local responses than 
company arrangements could do. This findings support the view that a decentralized 
strategy of franchised systems is more efficient than a centralized and specialized 
company arrangement. Garg and Rasheed (2005)  support this view. The scholars 
state, that franchisors particularly highlight the importance of local market assets and 
customer satisfactions. The ongoing learning and new knowledge can then be 
shared across the business units in the franchise system.  
Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) conducted a study in Texas about the relationship 
between multi-unit franchisors and their local market knowledge. According to their 
assumptions, the reason to conduct franchising lies in the specific know-how of 
franchisees. This may be special skills about specific market types. Other scholars 
such as Mathewson and Winter (1985) also justified franchising amongst others 
because of the franchisee’s knowledge of local markets. Kalnins and Lafontaine 
(2004) reveal that knowledge of local demand as well as customer tastes and unit 
productivity as well belongs into the list of needed resources, which the franchisee 
can provide to the franchisor. Thus, if the franchisor wants to expand its business 
units he is in the need of a high quality franchisee that already could acquire the 
necessary information. Therefore the franchisor has two options: either search for a 
new suitable franchisee or choose to give an already proven partner-franchisee 
additional units, which then is by definition multi-unit franchising. The authors 
suggest, that for the franchisor the second possibility would be easiest. Giving 
franchisees the right to own concentrated units in geographically close market that 
are demographically similar would minimize the costs of monitoring and capitalize the 
local market knowledge of the franchisee best. This also would imply the chance of 
clustering franchisees in special markets, as competition for the franchisee would be 
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low and thus would have a positive effect on the partnership between franchisor and 
franchisee. According to the authors this exact problem of too much competition 
already has emerged in America  
Another point of interest in their study was the hypothesis that single unit franchisees 
could not benefit of learning or experiences of other business units. Multi-unit 
franchisees could therefore be more productive, create economies of scale and their 
business units due to increased resources, capabilities and knowledge would stay 
longer in the market. In the empirical study, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) found out 
that franchisors by opening up additional units would choose franchisees that are 
geographically close to their already established business. The same is verified for 
demographic variables. Franchisors prefer franchisees that already conduct business 
in similar demographical markets, which also presumes that the same type of 
customers. According to their study it is also more possible that franchisors assign 
larger scale franchisees additional units than smaller multi-unit franchisees. This still 
may not be due to growth- but quality reasons. The same holds true for franchisees 
that did not obtain units for a longer time. On the other side the effect of longer 
distance to units and already established company-presence was tested. In that case 
franchisors prefer company-owned units instead of franchisees. In market 
environments that are highly competitive it is less probable that franchisees are 
granted additional units. This could be due to the fact that because of immense 
competition the management of units gets very complex and difficult. 
Gómez, González et al. (2010) also supported the theory of Kalnins and Lafontaine.  
In their study, they could empirically verify a positive relationship between 
geographical concentration of units of a franchise network and an amplified use of 
multi-unit franchising. For this correlation the scholars presented two opposite 
arguments. First, with the use of multi-unit franchising agency problems, as 
described in the first part, such as free-riding or shirking could be alleviated if the 
proximity of business-units is very close. Second, the franchisor uses the talents and 
resources, such as knowledge or experiences of already existing franchisees if he 
grants them other units in similar markets. This is, as already Kalnins and Lafontaine 
stated, dependent of market conditions that have to be the same the franchisee 
already operates in.  
	   33	  
Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) depict that the use of multi-unit franchising increases, 
if market conditions are the same and geographical proximity of business units is 
very close. They tested the correlation between network growth and the use of multi-
unit franchising. This hypothesis could not be verified statistically. The scholars argue 
that this effect is due to the expansion of franchise networks into new areas, where 
no units have been before. Thus single-unit franchising may be the only possible and 
meaningful way to occupy unknown local areas.  
According to Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) as well as Windsperger and Hussain 
(2010) the single-unit franchisee will exhibit more knowledge and incentives to 
efficiently respond to customer requirements than a multi-unit franchisee. A single-
unit franchisee will also have more knowledge about local markets and therefore 
about its customers. Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) further reveal that usually single-
unit franchisees live longer in a certain local area than hired managers of a mini-
chain in the case of multi-unit franchisees.  Based on Bradach (1998), company 
managers that are installed and paid by the firm tend to move often and therefore do 
not exhibit the necessary experience to appropriately serve and respond to the 
market. Therefore company-owned units use standardized and centralized 
structures, which are not the best way to address customer needs. Garg, Rasheed et 
al. (2005) as well as Windsperger and Hussain (2010) state that single-unit 
franchisees also tend to exploit market chances for local adaptation as this would 
provide additional returns and profit opportunities by offering extra particularities and 
charging higher prices. Another point of interest of Garg and Rasheed et al. (2005) is 
that  single-unit franchisees won’t shirk as they are residual claimants. Thus, 
following the work of Windsperger and Hussain (2010) we can derive the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H2a: “The Importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is negatively 
related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.” (Windsperger and Hussain 
2010) 
 
As already brought up in section B.3 “the resource-management process”, Sirmon, 
Hitt et al. (2007) state, that environmental uncertainty plays a major role in how 
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managing resources affect a companies performance. It is important that business-
unit managers examine their geographic environment for certain changes that could 
have an effect on customer relationships and accordingly company performance. The 
company has to react to differing scales of uncertainty and competitors. Based on 
Penrose (1959), the best way order to overcome uncertainty is the possession of as 
much knowledge as possible. In this sense, Windsperger and Hussain (2010) depict, 
that the local market knowledge of the franchisee will alter positively with the 
environmental uncertainty. The derived outcome is that as environmental uncertainty 
rises, so does the importance of local market knowledge of the franchisees. 
According to these facts the next hypothesis is derived according to the view of 
Windsperger and Hussain (2010): 
 
H2b: “The negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s tendency 




B.2.2)	  System-­‐specific	  assets	  in	  view	  of	  organizational	  capabilities	  	  
Regarding the view of March (1991), Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) as well as 
Windsperger and Hussain (2010) organizational learning and thus organizational 
capabilities can be split up into two activities: exploration and exploitation. Both are 
vital for organizations to compete in the marketplace. Due to March (1991) 
exploration is the “creation of new knowledge” which includes experimentation, 
discovery, innovation or risk taking. According to Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) 
exploration helps the franchise system to adapt to new environments. The authors 
further state that exploitation refers to the enhancement of already established 
organizational routines in order to improve overall performance.  
According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) exploitation capabilities correspond to 
monitoring-, knowledge, as well as entrepreneurial capabilities. Based on Shane 
(1996) franchisors  are able to generate monitoring capabilities. This is the fact if the 
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franchise system size increases, resources are assigned due to the expansion of this 
capability or if knowledge is established through learning mechanisms. As monitoring 
refers to the direct supervision of franchisees, Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994) 
postpone, that administrative costs occur due to the high effort. The monitoring costs 
are affected by entrepreneurial capability, importance of local market knowledge, 
proximity of business units and the distance of the units to the headquarters. In this 
regard, Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as well as Weaven and Herington (2007) 
state, that through the use of multi-unit franchising economies of monitoring can be 
implemented as the franchisor can delegate tasks to the multi-unit franchisee and his 
mini-chain. Therefore multi-unit franchising involves higher monitoring capabilities 
compared to single-unit franchising.  
Based on Bradach (1998) and Weaven and Herington (2007) multi-unit franchisees 
foster and facilitate the systemwide adaptation process in franchise chains. In terms 
of the franchisor, it is much easier to deal with few franchisees that manage mini-
chains instead of multiple single-unit operators. This in turn reduces the effort of the 
franchisor to implement new ideas or processes. According to the author multi-unit 
franchisees dispose of a higher level of business acumen that single-unit 
franchisees. In summary, the adaptation process of the franchise system is amplified 
through multi-unit franchisees in three ways: quality of adaptation, velocity of 
discovering new opportunities and treats regarding adaptation as well as 
implementation.  
Regarding human resource management, Weaven and Herington (2007) indicate 
that multi-unit franchisees do not require a great amount of initial training or support. 
Instead multi-unit franchisees are “sophisticated investors” and advocate low levels 
of stuff development. According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) multi-unit 
franchise systems result in higher levels of human resource capabilities contrary to 
single-unit systems. 
As stated above exploration capabilities refer to innovation. Windsperger and 
Hussain (2010) suggest that multi-unit franchising fosters innovation capabilities and 
thus system growth. In this regard Kaufmann and Dant (1998) depict that multi-unit 
franchisees tend to promote innovation. The authors further suggest that franchisors 
choose multi-unit franchising particularly if local-market innovations are of great 
importance. Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) explicate that managers of a company-
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owned unit do not possess the necessary motivation to foster innovation as they 
would not be able to gain the full benefits contrary to franchisees. 
Summing up, multi-unit franchising facilitates the development of exploration and 
exploitation capabilities. This in turn, according to the view of Windsperger and 
Hussain (2010) permits the emergence and exploitation of system specific know-
how. Jensen and Meckling (1992) define the term specific knowledge as “knowledge 
that is costly to transfer among agents”. Therefore in accordance with Windsperger 
and Hussain (2010) as the levels of system specific knowledge increase, so does the 
importance of monitoring-, knowledge transfer- and human resource capabilities. The 
following hypothesis can be derived:  
 
H3: “System-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor’s tendency 
toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010) 
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C)	  Empirical	  Study	  
 
C.1)	  Introduction	  	  
The following part focuses on the empirical analysis of the proposed hypotheses. 
With the background of the two parts A) The case of franchising and B) The 
Resource-based View and organizational capabilities the statistical analysis is 
conducted. At first we give an overview about the data and the questionnaire. In the 
next section the variables that are used in the analysis are explained.  	  	  
C.1.2)	  Sample	  and	  Data	  	  
For the empirical study, data were obtained from the Austrian and German franchise 
sector. At first, all franchised businesses that were registered as members of the 
Austrian Franchise Association (AFA) and German Franchise Association were 
obtained.  
 
C.1.2)	  The	  survey	  instrument	  	  
For the survey of the ownership patterns of franchised systems regarding single-and 
multi unit franchising an ad hoc questionnaire was developed.  
The basis of the questionnaire is a work of Associate Professor Dr. Windsperger and 
Dildar Hussain. Some development of the questionnaire was accomplished as to 
facilitate the fill-in out of a franchisors perspective. As a pre-test the questionnaire 
was sent to an analyst of the Austrian Franchise Association. All together the 
questionnaire contains a number of 120 questions regarding the ownership patterns 
of franchised businesses. For accomplishment of the questionnaire it takes around 
20 - 25 minutes. The complete questionnaire is attached in the Appendix. The 
questionnaire includes open as well as single-choice questions. Regarding the last, a 
7-point Likert-type scale was used. 
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The questionnaire, together with an incentive letter of Prof. Dr. Windsperger was sent 
by mail to all Austrian and German franchise businesses. After a first time frame of 
three weeks the questionnaires were sent out a second time to those companies that 
did not respond.  
 
C.1.3)	  Measures	  	  
The franchisors were asked to provide details of their ownership pattern: number of 
company-owned units and franchised units, number of franchisees, establishment of 
the franchised business, number of employees in the central office, investment costs, 
duration of franchised contracts, training activities. Furthermore the questionnaire 
included several questions regarding specific investment, environmental uncertainty, 
behavioural uncertainty, brand name, local market assets, financial resource scarcity, 
system specific assets, contractility of local market assets and contractility of system 
specific assets. One part of the questionnaire includes specific questions developed 
for the statistical analysis of the stated hypotheses with the differentiation of single-
unit franchising and multi-unit franchising.  
 
C.2.)	  Variables	  	  
Financial resources 
According Combs and Ketchen (1999)  the resource scarcity view of the firm states 
that franchising as a business option would provide the opportunity to overcome the 
lack of financial resources which the company is in the need of if it in the state of 
growth. Windsperger and Hussain (2010) further suggest that multi-unit franchisees 
posess stronger financial possibilities than single unit franchisees. This further 
implies that the use of multi-unit franchising makes it easier to overcome financial 
resource scarcity. The variable FINRES measures the availability of financial 
resources regarding the distinction between multi-unit franchisees and single-unit 
franchisees.  Respondents were asked to rate the availability of financial resources 
for opening new outlets in the form of a seven scale. The scale is built up as 
followed: 1 would be a great advantage through the use of single- unit franchising 
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and 7 would be a great advantage through the use of multi- unit franchising. In the 
middle of the scale the number 4 would imply no distinction between single – or 
multi- unit franchising.  
 
Local market assets 
Following Bradach (1998) for companies to grow and to expand it is of major 
importance to react to different customer needs and tastes. In a franchise agreement 
the franchisee operates at his local unit and is per se the specialist for local market 
assets in the specified geographic position.  
Regarding multi-unit franchising two contrary views were stated in section B.2.1.3.2. 
According to Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) as well as Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) 
a franchisor would favour one franchisee having multiple units in geographically 
similar markets, which is by definition a multi-unit franchisee. Multi-unit franchisees 
could therefore create economies of scale, and would be more productive than 
single-unit franchisees. Still, if the franchisor expands into unknown areas single-unit 
franchisees may be the only meaningful way to overcome the lack of local market 
assets. Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as well as Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) 
reveal that single unit franchisors are better able to serve different customer tastes 
than multi-unit franchisees. They usually live longer in certain areas, are possessing 
more local resources and are therefore quicker in responding to changing 
environments.  
The variable LOCALAS measures local market knowhow. Franchisors were asked to 
rate the advantages of higher local market know-how  on a 7-scale range, whereas 1 
has the meaning of a great advantage through the use of single-unit franchising and 
7 would be a great advantage through the use of multi-unit franchising.  
 
Local market uncertainty 
According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as environmental uncertainty 
increases so does the importance of local market assets and thus the local market 
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resources of the franchisee. We used the variable, LOCALASxUNCERT to measure 
local market uncertainty.  
 
System-specific assets 
As defined by Windsperger and Hussain (2010) or Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) in 
section B.2.2 system specific assets can be split up into exploration and exploitation 
capabilities. Exploration refers to the creation of new knowledge whereas exploitation 
implies the meaning of developing already established organizational routines. Both, 
exploitation as well as exploration capabilities are vital for the growth of the business. 
According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) the use of multi-unit franchising is 
positively related with system specific assets. In this sense we use the variables 
SYSAS1 and SYSAS2 to measure the degree of system specific assets. In the case 
of SYSAS1, respondents were asked to rate if their franchise system enjoys higher 
brand recognition as compared to their competitors on a 7 scale range whereas 1 
refers to strongly agree and 7 refers strongly disagree. The variable SYSAS2 refers 
to the question if the franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality. As before 




To test the internal consistency of our two variables, SYSAS1 and SYSAS2 
cronbach´s alpha is calculated. Here, cronbach´s alpha has the value 0,861. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, MUF, is calculated by dividing the number of franchised 
outlets by the number of franchisees. As stated, a multi-unit franchisee is defined as 
a franchisee that operates more than one unit at a time. The variables for this 
calculation are covered by the open questions “How much franchisees do you have 
in 2009?” and “How much franchised units do you have in 2009?”. Accordingly a 
value of MUF equal to 1, refers to single-unit franchising and a value of MUF greater 
than 1 refers to multi-unit franchising. 
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Control variables 
In the study we additionally used two different control variables. The first control 
variable refers to the size of the franchise network, namely SIZE, which includes 
company outlets and franchised business units. According to Gómez, Gonzáles et al. 
(2010) the size of the franchise network is positively related to the use of multi-unit 
franchising. As the network grows, the brand name value increases equally and thus 
sales and market share as well. The authors further mentioned, that trough the 
increasing size of the network system, adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
may emerge. A single franchisee will find it easier to free-ride and does not have to 
cope with the negative consequences on his own.  
The second control variable in this study is related to the age of the franchised 
system. This variable is calculated by subtracting the year of opening of the franchise 
system from the year 2009. According to Weaven and Frazer (2007) mature and 
sophisticated franchise system are positively related to the use of multi-unit 
franchising. In the first growth phase most franchisors do not possess a strong brand 
name and thus do not attract high quality franchisees. Franchisors further lack the 
important know how or administrative capabilities that are necessary for the 






C.3.1)	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  the	  respondent	  profile	  	  	  
To conduct a thorough statistical analysis it is important to examine the respondent 
profile of the franchisors that account for the present study. A total number of 137 
filled questionnaires were sent back and also could be used. Regarding the type of 
business in the present study the following question “ What kind of franchising is your 
business conducting?” was used. Here, 2,9% of our respondents claim to use 
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product franchising, 30,7% are in the sales/distribution industry and 59,1% conduct 




Type of franchising  
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Product franchising 4 2,9 3,1 3,1 
Sales / distribution 42 30,7 33,1 36,2 
Service 81 59,1 63,8 100,0 
Valid 
Total 127 92,7 100,0  
Missing -9 10 7,3   
Total 137 100,0   
 
Table 1: Type of franchising 
 
Regarding the type of franchised system, we can find out if the franchisor uses multi-
unit franchising or single-unit franchising. As stated, some questions concerning the 
ownership structure of the franchised business were posed. In this respect the two 
queries, that matter are: “What is the number of franchised units in 2009?” and “What 
is the number of franchisees in 2009?”.  Through this context, we can easily conduct 
the number of multi-unit franchisors, as those companies that inhibit more 
franchisees than franchised units use per definition multi-unit franchising as their 
strategy (one franchisee operates more than one unit at a time) (Grünhagen and 
Mittelstaedt 2000). In the present sample, 57,6 % use multi-unit franchising, and 
42,4% single-unit franchising. 
 
According to the sample of the present study, the typical franchisor owns on average 
31 company outlets and 123 franchised outlets. The first outlet was opened on 
average in the year 1998.  The initial franchise fee amounts to 12.668 €, whereas the 
average investment required by a franchisee to start a new franchised outlet amounts 
to 452.263 €. Concerning the monthly fixed royalties the average amount is 205 € 
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and the fix advertising /marketing fee about 72 €. The length of a franchise contract 





Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Number of company owned outlets 31,89 95,632 700 0 
Number of franchised outlets 123,36 302,06 2500 0 
Year when first outlet was opened 1998 8,3 2009 1976 
Franchise/entry fee in Euro  12668,57 14701,979 100.000 0 
Average investment (exclusing 
franchise/entry fee) required by a 
franchisee to start a new franchised 
outlet (Euro) 
452263,8 3,571E6 38.500.000 100 
Monthy fixed royalties (Euro) 205,75 764,61 7.500 0 
Fix advertising/marketing fee 
(Euros per month) 
72,44 294,47 2.300 0 
Franchise contract length in years 6,82 3,28 20 1 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistic of residents profile 
 
 
C.3.2)	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  ownership	  patterns	  	  
The aim of this part of the analysis is to provide an overview about the tendencies 
and answers of the respondents regarding their ownership pattern. At first a 
descriptive statistical analysis based on the described variables is conducted. 
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C.3.2.1.	  Financial	  resource	  scarcity	  
 
The first chart represents a frequency analysis of our variable FINRES, which 
represents the question if franchisors would regard a higher availability of financial 
resources for opening new outlets as a great advantage of single-unit franchising or 
multi-unit franchising. As we clearly can observe, 27% of all franchisors claim that 
there is no difference between the use of multi- or single unit franchising in this 
regard. In numbers, 5% of all respondents’ state that a higher availability of financial 
resources for opening new outlets is a great advantage through the use of single-unit 
franchising, whereas 13% see this as a great advantage of multi-unit franchising. 
 	  
Graph1: Frequency analysis of variable FINRES   
 
C3.2.2.	  Local	  market	  assets	  	  
The following graph describes the variable LOCALAS. Here respondents were 
asked: “As a franchisor, how do you see the advantages of multi-unit franchising 
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About 12% answered that it would be a great advantage through single-unit 
franchising, whereas around 32% claimed that higher market knowledge would 
neither be an advantage through single-unit franchising nor multi-unit franchising. 
Around 13% of the respondents claimed that it would be a great advantage through 
multi-unit franchising.  
 
 	  
Graph 2: Frequency analysis of variable LOCALAS 	  	  	  
C.3.2.3.	  Local	  market	  uncertainty	  	  
The next graph shows the distribution analysis of the first variable to measure 
environmental uncertainty, namely SALES. Respondents were asked to answer the 
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Around 7,3% off the participants strongly disagree to the statement whereas 19% are 
neutral to the question. Around 7,3% of the franchisors strongly agree to the 




Graph 3: Frequency analysis of the variable SALES  
 
The next graph exhibits the analysis of the variable UNCERT. The franchisors 
consulted were asked if “the economic environment in the local market is changing 
rapidly”.  
Around 8% strongly disagree to the statement, 21% adopt a neutral position, and just 
3,6% of the respondents strongly agree that the economic environment in the local 
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Graph 4: Frequency analysis of the variable UNCERT 	  
C.3.2.4.	  System	  specific	  assets	  	  
The following chart represents the frequency analysis of the first variable for system 
specific assets, namely SYSAS1. Franchisors were asked to rate the statement “our 
franchise system enjoys higher brand recognition as compared to our competitors”. 
No franchisor answered the statement with “strongly disagree”, while 13% of all 
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Graph 5: Frequency analysis of the variable SYSAS1 	  
 
The next graph shows the second variable to measure system specific assets, 
SYSAS2. Here, franchisors rated the statement “our franchise system enjoys a good 
reputation for quality”.  
For this variable, we can observe quite similar results as for SYSAS1. No 
respondents strongly disagrees to this statement, 9,6% answered the question with 
“neutral”, while 35% of the franchisors strongly agree that their franchise system 
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Graph 6: Frequency analysis of the variable SYSAS2 
 	  
C.4)	  	  Regression	  Analysis	  	  
The following hypotheses were developed in chapter B.2.:  
Hypothesis 1: “Franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his 
tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010) 
Hypothesis 2a: “The Importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is 
negatively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.” (Windsperger and 
Hussain 2010) 
Hypothesis 2b:  “The negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s 
tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty” (Windsperger and 
Hussain 2010) 
Hypothesis 3: “System-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor’s 
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To test the hypotheses we conducted a linear regression. As mentioned, the 
dependent variable MUF should be interpreted through the independent variables, 
FINRES, LOCALAS, LOCALASxUNCERT, UNCERT, SALES, LOCALASxSALES, 
SYSAS1 and SYSAS2. Additionally two control variables are used, namely AGE and 
SIZE. As described in chapter C.2.3.1 the variable FINRES is used to predict the 
financial resource scarcity theory. The variable LOCALAS represents the local 
market knowhow of the franchisor. The variables LOCALASxUNCERT as well as 
LOCALASxSALES represent the interaction of local market knowhow and economic 
uncertainty. System specific assets are displayed through the variables SYSAS1 and 
SYSAS2.  Further two control variables are included, whereas the variable AGE 
reflects the maturity of the franchise network and SIZE the franchise network size. 
The dependent variable MUF stands for the degree of multi-unit franchisors based on 
the total amount of franchisors in our analysis.  	  
According to the regression analysis we get the following equation:  
MUF = α0+ α1FINRES+ α2LOCALAS+ α3LOCALASxUNCERT+ α4UNCERT  + 
α5LOCALASxSALES +   α6SALES +  α7SYSAS1  α8SYSAS2 + α9AGE + α10SIZE  
 
According to our first hypothesis the variable FINRES should increase with the use of 
multi- unit franchising. As already discussed in chapter B.2.1.3.1 financial resources 
should be positively related with the use of multi – unit franchising. Therefore we 
expect that α1 has a positive coefficient indicating a high benefit of multi-unit 
franchising. Further we suggested that local market knowledge, as measured by the 
variable LOCALAS is negatively related with the use of multi-unit franchising. 
Accordingly α2 is supposed to have a negative coefficient as an indicator for a benefit 
of single-unit franchising regarding local market knowhow. Further we suggest that 
high environmental uncertainty increases the use of single-unit franchising as it 
amplifies the need for a thorough knowledge of local market conditions. Thus we 
hypothesize the coefficient of α3 as well as α5 to be negative. The variables SYSAS1 
and SYSAS2 are both either a part of system specific assets. In section B.2.2. we 
derived the hypothesis that exploration and exploitation capabilities are positively 
related to multi-unit franchising. In accordance to this view, the coefficients of α7 as 
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well as α8 should be positive. The variable AGE depicts the maturity of the franchise 
system. As stated in section C.2. the maturity of the franchise system is positively 
related with the use of  multi-unit franchising as it is related to a strong brand name 
and necessary administrative abilities. In accordance to this view we postulate the 
coefficient of α9 to be positive as well. The variable SIZE reflects the size of the 
franchise network. It is hypothesized that multi-unit franchising is in favour of an 
increasing franchise network. With its size, the brand name value, sales and market 





To analyze the problem of multicollinearity we have a look at the predictor variables. 
We clearly can observe that the only predictor variables that are highly correlated are 
the two variables to describe system specific assets, SYSAS1 and SYSAS2,  
LOCALAS and LOCALASxUNCERT, LOCALAS and LOCALASxSALES. The 
variables SIZE and AGE are also highly correlated which could indicate an 
interrelation between the maturity of the franchise system and it’s size. It is supposed 
that the maturity of a franchise network is correlated to the use of multi-unit 
franchising which in turn would lead to an increased size of the franchise network. In 
sum our data does not show an indicator of problem of multicollinearity. 
	   MUF	  	  	  	  	   FINRES	   LOCAL-­‐AS	   LOCALASxUNCERT	   UNCERT	   SYSAS1	   SYSAS2	   SIZE	   AGE	   LOCALAS	  xSALES	   SALES	  MUF	   1.00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  FINRES	   ,26**	   1,00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  LOCALAS	   -­‐,39**	   ,048	   1,00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  UNCERTx	  LOCALAS	   -­‐,327**	   ,040	   ,716**	   1,00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  UNCERT	   -­‐,193	   -­‐,111	   ,090	   ,674**	   1,00	   	   	   	   	   	   	  SYSAS1	   ,272**	   ,181	   ,076	   ,136	   ,034	   1,00	   	   	   	   	   	  SYSAS2	   ,126	   -­‐,207	   ,138	   ,068	   -­‐,044	   ,757**	   1,00	   	   	   	   	  SIZE	   ,107	   -­‐,086	   -­‐,140	   -­‐,033	   ,070	   -­‐,119	   -­‐,288**	   1,00	   	   	   	  AGE	   ,304**	   -­‐,004	   -­‐,222,7	   -­‐,051	   ,124	   ,163	   -­‐,004	   ,453**	   1,00	   	   	  LOCALASxSALES	   -­‐,312**	   -­‐,043	   ,727**	   ,734**	   ,325**	   ,021	   ,035	   -­‐,024	   -­‐,042	   1,00	   	  SALES	   -­‐,284**	   -­‐,227	   ,132	   ,349**	   ,409**	   -­‐,106	   -­‐,087	   ,061	   ,070	   ,709**	   1,00	  	  
Table 3: Correlations 
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ANOVA 
The following table displays the model summary of the regression analysis. In the 
third column R scare is indicated. It depicts the degree of the explained variance 
regarding the total variance of the dependent variable. This variable has the value of 




R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
dimension0 
1 ,681a ,463 ,410 ,78692 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FINRES, SYSAS1, SYSAS2, LOCALAS, UNCERT, SALES, 
LOCALASxSALES, LOCALASxUNCERT, AGE, SIZE  	  
Table 4: Model Summary 
 
The regression model has a significance value of 0,000 and a value F of 8,723 as 
depicted in the table Anova below. The coefficients that indicate the sign of α are 
summarized in the table Coefficients.  
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 54,018 10 5,402 8,723 ,000a 
Residual 62,544 101 ,619   
1 
Total 116,562 111    
a. Predictors: (Constant), FINRES, SYSAS1, SYSAS2, LOCALAS, UNCERT, SALES, 
LOCALASxSALES, LOCALASxUNCERT, AGE, SIZE  
b. Dependent Variable: MUF 	  
Table 5: Anova 
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Table 6: Coefficients 
 
Hypothesis 1: “Franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his 
tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010) 
As displayed in table 6, FINRES has a positive coefficient. The variable displays the 
financial resource scarcity theory. As Windsperger and Hussain (2010) reveal that 
multi-unit franchisees possess the financial background and strength of establishing 
further units. Chalupnik (2009) asserted that multi-unit franchisees would have 
stronger balance sheets and more capital to invest. As FINRES has a positive 
coefficient but a significance value of 0,121 (p < 0,05)  we can just can observe a 
tendency that franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his 










B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2,861 ,729  3,924 0,000 
FINRES ,073 ,047 ,124 1,563 ,121 
LOCALAS -,504 ,112 -,893 -4,507 ,000 
UNCERT 0,28 ,114 ,044 ,245 ,807 
LOCALASxUNCERT -,027 ,027 -,260 -1,001 ,319 
SALES -,500 ,110 -,890 -4,536 ,000 
LOCALASxSALES ,104 ,026 1,131 4,058 ,000 
SYSAS1 ,222 ,094 ,268 2,357 ,020 
SYSAS2 -,089 ,096 -,104 -,928 ,356 
AGE ,016 ,011 ,136 1,541 ,356 
1 
SIZE 1,475E-5 ,000 ,005 ,056 ,956 
a. Dependent Variable: MUF 
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Hypothesis 2a: “The Importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is 
negatively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.” (Windsperger and 
Hussain 2010) 
The variable LOCALAS shows a negative coefficient. Due to Windsperger and 
Hussain (2010) single-unit franchisees have the required knowledge and incentives 
to react to differing customer needs in certain locations. In this sense as single-unit 
franchisees have the required capabilities they are able to exploit market chances 
and thus earn higher profits. The variable LOCALAS shows a significance value of 
0,000 (p < 0,05)  thus we can support our Hypothesis and state that the importance 
of local market know-how of the franchisee is negatively related with the franchisor’s 
tendency toward MUF. 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  “The negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s 
tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty” (Windsperger and 
Hussain 2010) 
The variable LOCALASxUNCERT has a p-value of 0,319 (p < 0,05) and is therefore 
not significant. The variable LOCALASxSALES shows a positive coefficient and has 
a significance value of 0,000 (p < 0,05).  Thus the results do not support the 
hypothesis2b that the negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s 
tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty. 
 
Hypothesis 3: “System-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor’s 
tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010) 
The variable SYSAS1 has a positive coefficient and a significance value of 0,020 (p <  
0,05). This implies that according to our analysis system-specific assets are 
positively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward multi-unit franchising, and the 
hypothesis is supported. The second variable, SYSAS2 shows a negative coefficient, 
and a significance value of 0,465. As the significance value of  0,356 is higher than 
0,05  (p <  0,05) the result of this variable is not significant.  
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Control variables:  
The variable SIZE has a positive coefficient, but the significance value is higher than 
0,05 (p <  0,05), thus the result of this variable is not significant. The second control 
variable, AGE shows a positive coefficient. The p-value of AGE is 0,126 (p <  0,05) 
and thus as well not significant.  	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C.5)	  Conclusion	  	  
 
This paper focused on the rather new field of franchising: multi-unit franchising. We 
used the resource-based view to analyze three major topics in this field: financial 
resource scarcity, local market assets and system specific assets. Due to the 
empirical analysis we could show a tendency that multi-unit franchising is a way to 
overcome the capital restraints of the company owner, namely the franchisor as 
multi-unit franchisees possess more financial resources to quickly grow and expand 
the company. In regard to local market assets we can support the hypothesis that 
local market knowhow is be positively related to single-unit franchising. Another point 
of interest is the hypothesis that as environmental uncertainty rises, so does the 
importance of local market knowhow is supported as well. To analyze the relationship 
between system specific assets and multi-unit franchising we used two variables. We 
could support the hypothesis that system-specific assets are positively related to the 
use of multi-unit franchising.  
This paper still has some limitations, as it did not distinguish between the different 
types of multi-unit franchising, such subfranchising, area development multi-unit 
strategy or sequential multi-unit strategy. For a deeper and further analysis of this 
topic the agency theory should be taken into account as we could prove that also 
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Appendix	  A:	  Abstract	  in	  German	  	  	  
In der heutigen Wirtschaftswelt kann man Franchising als ein Schlüsselwerkzeug 
bezeichnen. Diese Form der Organisation hat ihren Ursprung in den frühen 1980er 
und konnte seitdem stark an Bedeutung gewinnen. Es kann als ein Arrangement 
zwischen Franchisegeber und Franchisenehmer definiert werden, wobei der 
Franchisegeber, als Gründer eines Geschäftszweiges, das Recht an den 
Franchisenehmer verkauft, den Handelsnahmen sowie das  Geschäftssystem zu 
nutzen. Es wurden im Laufe der Zeit verschiedene Theorien aufgestellt die 
versuchten zu verdeutlichen warum genau diese Form der Organisation anderen 
vorgezogen wird. Eine dieser Haupttheorien wird als der „Resource-based View“ 
bezeichnet. Laut Barney, Wright und anderen (2001) ist der „Resource-based View“ 
vielleicht die einflussreichste Theorie in Bezug auf strategisches Management. 
Andererseits entwickelten sich im Laufe der Zeit zwei dominante Formen des 
Franchising: single-unit und multi-unit Franchising. Bezogen auf Multi-unit 
Franchising hat der Franchisenehmer das Recht, mehr als eine  Geschäftseinheit zu 
betreiben. Diese Form besitzt eindeutige Vorteile gegenüber der Form des single-unit 
Franchising, wie ein beschleunigtes Unternehmenswachstum, schnellere 
Marktdurchdringung oder bessere Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten. In den letzten Jahren 
hat sich die einschlägige Literatur mehr und mehr auf diese Art des Franchising 
spezialisiert, wobei bis heute die empirische Grundlage dazu fehlt. In dieser Studie 
werden wir den Ansatz des multi-unit Franchising mit dem Resource-based View 
verknüpfen, wobei der Fokus auf finanzielle Ressourcenknappheit, lokales 
Marktwissen und System-spezifische Ressourcen gelegt wird. Mit Hilfe einer breit 
angelegten Studie des österreichischen Franchisesektors können wir unsere Thesen 
schließlich statistisch auswerten.  	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  sowie	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  in	  Deutsch,	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  und	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  in	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